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Abstract 
In the decision-making literature, it is known that preferences between two options can be 
influenced in different ways by the introduction of a third option. We investigated whether 
such influences could be demonstrated when making decisions about qualitative aspects of 
episodic memories. In a baseline condition, participants were asked which of two dissimilar 
events they remembered more vividly: (A) a well-known Olympic victory, or (B) the death 
of a well-known public figure. In two further conditions, a third event was added: (C) an 
Olympic victory similar and competitive to A, or (D) an Olympic victory similar but inferior 
to A. With the addition of C, participants were less likely to choose A than B (similarity 
effect), whereas with the addition of D, they were more likely to choose A than B (attraction 
effect), suggesting that effects known in decision-making can be generalised to relative 
judgments about episodic memories. 
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Similarity and Attraction Effects in Episodic Memory Judgments 
 Although there are demonstrations that the contents of memory can be altered in 
systematic ways (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Wade, Garry, Read, & 
Lindsay, 2002), it is generally assumed that memory recall is reliable (Neisser, 1988) and 
that qualitative aspects of episodic memories can be meaningfully used in reaching decisions 
about past events. For example, mock jurors are more influenced by eyewitness testimonies 
that contain a greater degree of detail (Bell & Loftus, 1988); attributes such as sensory and 
contextual detail can help to distinguish between memory for performing an action and 
memory for the intention to perform that action (see Johnson & Raye, 1981, on reality 
monitoring); and memory strength contributes to the dating of events such that stronger 
traces are judged to be more recent than weaker ones (Hinrichs, 1970; Hintzman, 2005). The 
aim of the present article is to show that such decisions about qualitative aspects of episodic 
memories can be influenced by the available options (i.e., context) in a manner that 
resembles previous demonstrations in the decision-making literature (see Roe, Busemeyer, & 
Townsend, 2001, for a summary). 
 Consider the case of two very different airline tickets between which customers are 
approximately equally divided in their preferences: A is a cheap flight requiring four stops, 
whereas B is an expensive nonstop flight. The introduction of a third option, C, that is 
similar and competitive to A in being even cheaper but requiring five stops, reduces the 
probability that A will be chosen relative to B (Burton & Zinkhan, 1987; Tversky, 1972). 
Thus, C steals more from the similar than from the dissimilar option, a result termed the 
similarity effect. In contrast, the introduction of a third option, D, that is similar to, but 
dominated by, A in being both more expensive and requiring five stops, increases the 
probability that A will be chosen relative to B (Bhargava, Kim, & Srivastava, 2000; Huber, 
Payne, & Puto, 1982; Wedell, 1991), termed the asymmetric dominance or attraction effect. 
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These effects violate the preferential choice properties of, respectively, the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives and the regularity principle (which states that the probability of 
choosing an option should not be increased by the addition of a new option) and thereby 
challenge traditional models of probabilistic choice (e.g., Luce, 1959; Thurstone, 1959; 
Tversky, 1972). However, more recent theories have been proposed that can successfully 
account for both effects (e.g., Roe et al., 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004). 
 Can similarity and attraction effects be generalized to a different domain, namely, 
episodic memory? We asked participants to decide which of two (A/B) or three (A/B/C; 
A/B/D) familiar public events they remembered most vividly. The events A-D were 
designed to correspond with the options already described so that the ABC condition was 
predicted to result in a similarity effect in comparison with the AB (baseline) condition, 
whereas the ABD condition was predicted to result in an attraction effect relative to baseline. 
Thus, overall, the proportion of participants choosing A rather than B was predicted to be 
lower in the ABC (similarity) condition than in the ABD (attraction) condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 Data were collected from two samples: Sample 1 comprised 200 undergraduates 
from the University of Warwick, UK, aged 18-25 years (M = 21.4; SD = 1.7) who received 
no payment for participation. Sample 2 comprised 330 adults aged 18-70 years (M = 36.2, 
SD = 11.8) who were registered with “ipoints”, an online loyalty scheme enabling people to 
earn ipoints for behaviors such as shopping at particular online stores or participating in 
research (see http://www.ipoints.co.uk/redeem/). Participants in Sample 2 received 15 
ipoints (£1.50 or approximately $3) to spend in the ipoints shop. 
Participants in each sample were randomly assigned to one of three conditions – 
Baseline, Similarity and Attraction – with n = 70, 65 and 65, respectively, for Sample 1, and 
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n = 108, 98 and 124, respectively, for Sample 2. The numbers of females and males in each 
condition were almost identical (Sample 1) or identical (Sample 2). 
Stimuli 
An appropriate set of events was selected on the basis of data from a different group 
of 50 Warwick undergraduates (25 females; 25 males) aged 18-25 years (M = 21.3; SD = 
1.6) who rated well-known (in Britain, at least) public events from the past 10 years. Five 
sets of four events were drawn up to satisfy the following requirements: A = a memorable 
public event; B = as memorable as A but conceptually dissimilar; C = as memorable as A 
and conceptually similar; D = less memorable than A but conceptually similar. (Note the 
correspondence with the airline tickets in the Introduction where A and B were very different 
but equally attractive tickets, C was as attractive as A and with characteristics closely 
resembling those of A, and D was less attractive than A but also with characteristics closely 
resembling those of A.) The students completed a questionnaire in which they were asked to 
rate (1) the vividness of their memory for each event (presented in random order) on a 7-
point scale from 1 = extremely weak to 7 = extremely strong, and (2) the conceptual 
similarity between pairs of events (A & B; A & C; A & D; for each set) on a 7-point scale 
from 1 = extremely dissimilar to 7 = extremely similar, also presented in random order. 
The event set that most closely matched our criteria is shown in Table 1, together 
with the overall ratings of vividness and conceptual similarity. [Note that Event B was The 
Dunblane shootings for Sample 1, who were tested in the presence of an experimenter. Event 
B was subsequently changed to The death of The Queen Mother for Sample 2 (who were 
tested via the Internet) to avoid distressing anyone personally affected by the tragedy at 
Dunblane.] Event A did not differ in vividness from Events B1, B2 or C (all p’s > .05) but 
was rated as more vivid than Event D, t(49) = 7.45, p < .01. The A-B1 pair was rated as less 
conceptually similar than either the A-C or A-D pairs, t(49) = 44.65 and 40.51, respectively, 
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p’s < .01, with no difference between the latter two pairings (p > .05). (Conceptual similarity 
ratings were not obtained for the A-B2 pair but it seems unlikely that Steve Redgrave’s 
victory and The Queen Mother’s death would be regarded as any less dissimilar than Steve 
Redgrave’s victory and the Dunblane shootings.) 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with a sheet of paper by an experimenter (Sample 1) or 
directed to a computer screen by an email (Sample 2) that introduced the experiment as 
about memory for past events. They were then asked to answer a single question either by 
indicating their response to the experimenter (Sample 1) or by mouse-clicking on a button 
next to one of the response options (Sample 2). The question was “Which of these events do 
you remember most vividly?”. The events were A and B for those in the Baseline condition, 
A, B and C in the Similarity condition, and A, B and D in the Attraction condition (see Table 
1). For Sample 1, both the condition and the order in which the events were presented within 
a condition were counterbalanced by the experimenter so that each condition and each 
possible ordering of events within a condition were administered almost equally often. For 
Sample 2, the computer program randomly selected both the condition and the order in 
which the events were presented, resulting in approximately equal numbers of participants in 
each condition and event order. After making their response, participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
Results 
Samples 1 and 2 produced qualitatively identical patterns of results; the data were 
therefore combined across samples for the main analyses to maximize power. (For brevity, 
The Queen Mother’s death in Table 2 and Figure 1 refers to both that event and the 
Dunblane shootings.) Table 2 shows participants’ responses in each condition. As expected, 
few people chose Event C in the Similarity condition and even fewer chose Event D in the 
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Attraction condition. Crucially, choices between Events A and B varied significantly in the 
predicted ways as a function of condition, χ2(2, N = 515) = 5.98, p = .050, Cramér’s V = 
.108, with fewer choices of Event A in the Similarity condition and more choices of Event A 
in the Attraction condition, in comparison with the Baseline condition. Neither the similarity 
nor the attraction effect alone reached significance (χ2(1, N = 330) = 1.14 for Baseline vs. 
Similarity; χ2(1, N = 363) = 2.00 for Baseline vs. Attraction; both p’s > .05) but the 
Similarity and Attraction conditions differed significantly, χ2(1, N = 337) = 5.88, p < .02, 
Cramér’s V = .132. 
The effects can be seen more clearly in Figure 1 where the percentages of 
participants choosing A and B (out of those choosing either A or B) are displayed for each 
condition. Numerically, the similarity effect (a swing of 5.8% from Event A to Event B 
compared with baseline) was slightly smaller than the attraction effect (an opposite swing of 
7.4%). One reason for the relatively weak similarity effect may be that Event C was not a 
sufficiently strong competitor to Event A to exert much influence on relative choices 
between A and B (note that C was chosen by only 11 people). Another test of the similarity 
effect would therefore be to reverse the assignment of Steve Redgrave and Matthew Pinsent 
to Events A and C. This would then require a new Baseline condition with A = Matthew 
Pinsent and B = Queen Mother to compare with the old Similarity condition but with Events 
A and C reversed (i.e., A = Matthew Pinsent; B = Queen Mother; C = Steve Redgrave). Data 
were therefore collected from a further group of 80 Warwick undergraduates (M age = 21.3 
years; SD = 4.1) who were asked to indicate which event they remembered more vividly: 
Matthew Pinsent winning a gold medal in rowing at the Athens Olympics or The death of 
The Queen Mother (order counterbalanced across participants). Their choices between 
Matthew Pinsent (n = 30) and The Queen Mother (n = 50) differed significantly from those 
in the Similarity condition of Sample 21 (n = 8 and 55, respectively),2 χ2(1, N = 143) = 11.11, 
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p < .001, Cramér’s V = .279. It can be seen from Figure 2 that this version of the similarity 
effect was larger than before, producing a swing of 24.8% from Event A to Event B on the 
inclusion of Event C. 
Discussion 
To summarise the findings, participants’ judgments concerning the vividness of their 
memories for two dissimilar events (A and B) were influenced as predicted by the addition 
of a third event (C or D). Thus, there was a shift from A to B when the third event (C) was 
similar and competitive to A, and a shift from B to A when the third event (D) was similar 
but inferior to A. These shifts correspond, respectively, to the similarity and attraction effects 
observed in the decision-making literature (e.g., Huber et al., 1982; Tversky, 1972). The 
effects were quite weak (see measures of association), but the similarity effect was 
strengthened by increasing C’s competitiveness over A. Effect sizes in the decision-making 
literature also tend to vary depending on the stimuli and task conditions (e.g., Kim & Hasher, 
2005). Tversky (1972) observed similarity effects of 9% and 13% swings from baseline 
when choosing between college applicants and gambles, respectively. Huber et al.’s (1982) 
attraction effects when choosing between different brands ranged from 2% for films to 13% 
for cars, with an overall average of 9%, whereas Wedell (1991) observed an attraction effect 
of around 20%. The present effect sizes of 6% (Figure 1) and 25% (Figure 2) for similarity 
and 7% for attraction are therefore roughly comparable, despite the reduction in 
experimental control from using real-world events encountered outside the laboratory several 
years previously. Together, the results provide a novel demonstration that judgments about 
qualitative aspects of episodic memories, such as those outlined in the Introduction, cannot 
be made independently but instead are influenced by the context in which the events are 
presented.  
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One way to understand the present findings is in terms of two processes, attention-
switching and lateral inhibition (cf. Roe et al., 2001). The similarity effect depends on the 
first process in which relative rather than absolute choices between options are made along a 
series of dimensions, with the outcomes integrated over time. In the present case, the notion 
of vividness or memorability is regarded as multidimensional with participants, either 
consciously or unconsciously, comparing episodic memories in terms of dimensions such as 
level of visual and/or auditory detail, emotionality, national/historical significance, 
recallability of personal circumstances and/or reactions at the time, and so on. When 
attention is focused on one dimension, A and C might be preferred over B, whereas when 
attention is focused on another dimension, B might then be preferred over A and C. Thus, 
the additional option C only takes away from its similar option A and does not affect the 
overall probability of choosing the dissimilar option B – hence the similarity effect. The 
second process of lateral inhibition explains the attraction effect as follows: Relative 
comparisons between D and the other two options A and B result in a negative preference 
state for D, which then feeds back through negative inhibitory connections to A and B. This 
produces a bolstering (disinhibitory) effect on nearby A but not on distant B because the 
connection between D and B is too weak. (In the present case, we make the common 
assumption that semantically related events such as Olympic victories have stronger 
associative links in memory than unrelated events such as an Olympic victory and the death 
of a public figure.) Thus, the inclusion of D enhances the strength of the dominant option A 
relative to option B – hence the attraction effect. 
Our study raises the possibility that other effects identified in the decision-making 
literature could also be extended to judgments about episodic memories. For example, in the 
compromise effect (e.g., Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Simonson, 1989), a third option, E, 
representing a compromise between A and B (e.g., a mid-priced flight requiring two stops 
  Similarity and Attraction 10
for the case in the Introduction) can be preferred in the ternary choice (ABE) even when it is 
not preferred in either binary choice (AE or BE). An interaction between the two processes 
of attention-switching and lateral inhibition can explain the compromise effect (see Roe et 
al., 2001). It remains to be seen whether suitable events can be constructed to test whether a 
compromise effect can also be found in episodic memory. 
 Other questions for future research include: (1) Do similarity and attraction effects 
apply to all episodic memories or are there exceptions, such as flashbulb memories (see 
Brown & Kulik, 1977)? (2) Do the effects apply to all individuals or are some groups less 
susceptible (e.g., for evidence that older adults show smaller attraction effects in decision-
making than do young adults, see Kim & Hasher, 2005; Tentori, Osherson, Hasher, & May, 
2001)? (3) Do the effects apply to other aspects of episodic memories in addition to 
vividness, such as relative recency judgments (Friedman, 1993)? (4) Do the effects apply to 
speeded as well as to nonspeeded conditions (see Roe et al., 2001, for discussion of 
differential effects of time pressure on similarity, attraction and compromise effects in 
decision-making)? 
 In conclusion, the present results demonstrate that at least two effects known in 
decision-making can be generalised to relative judgments about episodic memories. They 
therefore illustrate the value of combining insights from the memory and decision-making 
literatures, a point also emphasised by Dougherty and Sprenger (2006) in their study of the 
effects of irrelevant information in working memory on probability judgments. 
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Footnotes 
1Sample 2 was the appropriate comparison group for this new Baseline condition 
because the Dunblane shootings were not used. 
2The remaining 35 participants in the Similarity condition of Sample 2 chose Steve 
Redgrave.
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Table 1 
Overall Ratings on Seven-Point Scales for Vividness of the Memory for Each Event and 
Conceptual Similarity Between Pairs of Events (N = 50) 
 
  Vividness 
Event M SD 
A Steve Redgrave winning a gold medal in rowing at the 
Sydney Olympicsa
 
4.64 1.68 
B1 The Dunblane shootingsb 4.52 2.00 
B2 The death of The Queen Motherc 4.66 1.42 
C Matthew Pinsent winning a gold medal in rowing at the 
Athens Olympicsd
 
4.40 2.19 
D Jason Queally winning a gold medal in the 1km cycle 
time trial at the Sydney Olympicse
 
2.38 1.82 
  Conceptual similarity 
Event Pair M SD 
A & B1  (Steve Redgrave and Dunblane) 1.12 0.35 
A & B2 (Steve Redgrave and Queen Mother)f --- --- 
A & C  (Steve Redgrave and Matthew Pinsent) 6.28 0.76 
A & D  (Steve Redgrave and Jason Queally) 6.16 0.74 
Note. B1 was used for Sample 1; B2 was used for Sample 2. 
aGenerally regarded as Britain’s greatest-ever Olympian, Sir Steven Redgrave won an 
unprecedented fifth gold medal in consecutive Olympics in 2000 by a margin of 0.38 s in the 
Coxless Fours. bOn March 13, 1996, Thomas Hamilton walked into the gym hall of 
Dunblane Primary School in Scotland and shot and killed 16 5-6 year-old children and their 
teacher (see Cullen, 1996). cQueen Elizabeth, The Queen Mother was Queen Consort to 
King George VI (1936-52) and mother of his successor, Queen Elizabeth II. She died on 
March 30, 2002, at Royal Lodge, Windsor, aged 101. dMatthew Pinsent CBE won his fourth 
gold medal in consecutive Olympics in 2004 by a margin of 0.08 s in the Coxless Fours. 
eJason Queally MBE won his gold medal on Day 1 of the Sydney Olympics (the first of 
Britain’s 11 gold medals in 2000). fData not obtained. 
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Table 2 
Numbers of Participants Choosing Each of Two/Three Events as the More/Most Vividly 
Remembered in the Baseline, Similarity and Attraction Conditions 
 
 Event 
 
 
Condition 
 
A 
Steve Redgrave’s 
victory 
B 
Queen Mother’s 
death 
C 
Matthew 
Pinsent’s victory 
D 
Jason Queally’s 
victory 
Baseline 83 95 --- --- 
Similarity 62 90 11 --- 
Attraction 100 85 --- 4 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Percentages of participants choosing Steve Redgrave’s victory in Sydney (A) or 
The Queen Mother’s death (B) as the event they remembered more vividly in the Baseline, 
Similarity and Attraction conditions of the main study. For the latter two conditions, 
participants choosing the additional event (Matthew Pinsent’s victory in Athens [C] and 
Jason Queally’s victory in Sydney [D], respectively) were ignored. 
Figure 2. Percentages of participants choosing Matthew Pinsent’s victory in Athens or The 
Queen Mother’s death as the event they remembered more vividly in the Baseline and 
Similarity conditions of the reverse study (A = Matthew Pinsent; B = Queen Mother; C = 
Steve Redgrave). In the Similarity condition, participants choosing the additional event (C) 
were ignored. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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